| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 109.2

You have not been recognized as a subscriber to the AHR online. About 211 words from this article are provided below; about 704 words remain.

If you are a individual member of the American Historical Association, you may:: • login here if you have already registered for online access.; • Or if you're already logged in register your subscription.
• Set up your online account for the first time. AHA members can go to the AHA individual membership section to locate their member numbers.
If you are not a member of the American Historical Association, you can:: • Join the AHA and receive many member benefits including print and electronic issues of the American Historical Review.
• Purchase a research pass to gain two hour access to the entire History Cooperative web site. You will have full access to current issues of the American Historical Review (104.3-present). Note: the Research Pass does not provide access to JSTOR's holdings of the American Historical Review.
Instititutions can:: • Subscribe to this journal and receive print and electronic issues.
• Activate your existing subscription so that we recognize your IP number ranges.

| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 109.2 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Comparative/World

Christopher Price. Britain, America and Rearmament in the 1930s: The Cost of Failure. New York: Palgrave. 2001. Pp. xvi, 228. $65.00.

This is a major work with equally significant flaws. It contains much good that is hard to tell from the bad, so linked are these qualities, so ambitious is the reach and so convoluted the argument. Christopher Price focuses on the political economics of appeasement and the ties between British finance and power. During 1931–1938, he argues, after Britain left the gold standard and free trade and moved to imperial preference, its economy boomed, performing better than that of any other state. Meanwhile, it faced a German military menace and an American economic one, aimed to make Britain return to financial orthodoxy. Britain's response to these threats was linked, because its elites favored that return, saw finance as the "fourth arm" of defense, alongside navies, armies, and air forces, and thought military spending would sap the economy. So Britain failed to rearm as far or as fast as possible; it returned to orthodoxy, letting its gold reserves cross the Atlantic, weakening its "war chest" and ability to mobilize imperial economic resources. Simultaneously, Britain appeased Germany and the United States and lost to them both.

. . .

There are about 704 more words in this article. Please log in (or, if you are not yet an authorized user, please go to the User Setup page) to gain full access rights. Or if you're already logged in register your subscription.