| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 109.1

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| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 109.1 | The History Cooperative

Jeremi Suri. Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2003. Pp. viii, 355. $29.95.
Contemporary history often seems hamstrung by artificial barriers. There has been plenty of valuable work done in political and diplomatic history, and plenty more in social and cultural history over the last four decades. Rarely, however, are these strands linked. Thus the question usually asked of the protests of 1968 is "how did they change culture or societal norms?" Jeremi Suri's engaging book poses a more difficult question about the effects these protests had on global politics.	1
The book begins at the close of the Cold War's first phase, as Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Konrad Adenauer, and Nikita Khrushchev looked for ways to temper the threat of nuclear destruction. Pulling back from the brink, they sought to recover international stability (albeit a hostile stability). Without the promise of imminent victory on the world stage, they instead offered economic progress and attention to core values. Other leaders—Charles de Gaulle and Mao Zedong—employed slogans of national pride and popular mobilization to muscle their way into the superpower club.	. . .

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