Book Review

Comparative/World

A scholar known for her previous work on the origins of nationalism, Liah Greenfeld now argues that nationalism was the critical factor in turning societies toward economic growth. Like Max Weber, she believes that traditional society devalued economic activity. Rather than looking to Protestantism as the force that broke down this opposition, however, Greenfeld believes that "the factor responsible for the reorientation of economic activity toward growth is nationalism" (p. 1). Nationalism did this by promoting "the type of social structure which the modern economy needs to develop": that is, an egalitarian form of society, although Greenfeld does not explain in what sense societies that employed economic nationalism were "egalitarian." In addition, because "nationalism implies international competition," it justifies self-sacrifice for the sake of the nation (p. 23). People pursue economic growth to strengthen their country against other countries.	1
Greenfeld argues that modern, as opposed to traditional, societies pursue economic growth as an end in itself, not as a "rational" strategy. Her argument, however, is contradictory. She also contends that modern societies pursue economic growth for nationalist reasons. The latter strategy could easily be considered economically rational in the sense that the means are oriented to achieve an understandable goal. As in her book, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (1992), Greenfeld makes England the model. In the seventeenth century, England simultaneously developed as a merchant capitalist power and as the first nationalist society. English nationalism "allowed the economy's emergence from its traditionally subordinate position in relation to political and religious institutions" (p. 57). The Dutch in the seventeenth century, by contrast to the English, "did not choose to become modern. They did not make a fetish of ever-continued growth . . . They remained economically rational instead . . . In other words, they were not a nation" (p. 90).	2
The central problem with this book is that it is unclear how nationalist ideas changed the economy. As Greenfeld acknowledges, her argument implies that ideas change economic behavior, but she also denies that this is the case: "one must keep in mind (especially since the present thesis is likely to be accused of doing so) that the birth of the spirit of capitalism and new economic consciousness could not, in and of itself and thin air, produce advanced economic structures" (p. 145). This raises the question of how nationalism did influence economic development. Apparently, an economic ideology was not necessary for economic growth. The Dutch, according to Greenfeld, lacked one and still produced the first successful capitalist economy. In the British case, too, a nationalist economic ideology did not precede economic growth. The British generated a favorable view of capitalism while capitalism was growing.	3
France, Greenfeld's "first convert" to economic nationalism, raises further questions. Why should such a nationalist society not have had more vigorous economic growth? Greenfeld blames the Physiocrats because they turned against mercantilism, which reputedly had made England great (pp. 150–53). Somehow England thrived under mercantilism while France did not, apparently because France had an underdeveloped economic spirit. This analysis seems flawed. England, despite the rhetoric of its pamphleteers, was, in the end, one of the least mercantilist and most individualist of European societies, as Greenfeld admits (p. 223). The French mercantilist policies were often motivated by fiscal demands, which Greenfeld never deals with, and were frequently disastrous for the French economy. Greenfeld does not even try to explain why France did not grow more vigorously after the revolution swept the Physiocrats away and nationalism became a major force defining French society. Apparently, even an upsurge of nationalism did not help France grow economically.	. . .