| A Response to Beyond the Cultural Turn | The American Historical Review, 107.5

Review Essays

A Response to Beyond the Cultural Turn

PATRICK BRANTLINGER

The "new cultural history" shares more with two other movements—cultural studies and the new historicism—than some of its practitioners perhaps wish to recognize. Among other items, all three share the difficulties of the culture concept, and all of the contributors to Beyond the Cultural Turn acknowledge these difficulties. Asked by the editors of the New Left Review why he adopted "the term culture, in full consciousness of its accumulated semantic range, to denote a whole way of life—in preference to the term society," Raymond Williams replied that, "for all its difficulties," he felt "culture more conveniently indicates a total human order than society as it had come to be used." But, he added, "you know the number of times I've wished that I had never heard of the damned word. I have become more aware of its difficulties, not less, as I have gone on." ¹ Williams stressed those difficulties in all of his major works, starting with Culture and Society. ² This cultural historian of the concept of culture in British discourse also stressed that culture and other "keywords"—society, history, ideology, art, class, democracy—are sites of ideological struggle. He agreed with V. N. Voloinov that "each word" in any language "is a little arena for the clash and criss-crossing of differently oriented social accents." ³ 1

     In her contribution to Beyond, Sonya Rose says much the same about "symbols": "Distinctions and boundaries . . . are actively created as people manipulate symbols. Moreover, [symbols] create order not simply because they provide a cognitive map that everyone in a society just follows, but because they are the outcome of struggles over the power to define—of contests, in other words, over symbolic power."⁴ Williams is cited only a few times in Beyond, but cultural studies—a movement that Williams did as much as anyone to found—gets somewhat more frequent play and, indeed, its fullest consideration in Rose's essay. "The cultural turn," note the editors of Beyond, "and the accompanying collapse of explanatory paradigms, has produced a variety of corollaries. One is the rise of 'cultural studies.'" They add that, for cultural studies, "causal explanation takes a back seat, if it has a seat at all, to the demystification and deconstruction of power." But is "power" ever not causal, or a general name for historical effectiveness? Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt also claim that "many critics have pointed to the vagueness of culture, especially within cultural studies."⁵ But why "especially" in cultural studies? 2

     It is difficult to know what to make of the editors' comments about cultural studies.⁶ One reason that they perhaps wish to distance themselves from that movement may be a growing "division between history and cultural studies," such that, as Michael Pickering puts it, there is "now a sort of stand-off between social history and cultural studies." During the 1960s and 1970s, cultural studies had a "historical dimension" that drew on the British Marxist historians for theories and models.⁷ The importance of E. P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class to the early formation of cultural studies was perhaps second only to that of Williams's Culture and Society. The British history journals Past and Present and History Workshop have also been major venues for cultural studies, including "people's history." But more recent cultural studies work has abandoned this "historical dimension." Although there are exceptions, writes Pickering, "the 'historical myopia' castigated in [Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson's] Resistance through Rituals has become endemic in forms of cultural studies that have developed in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly as epistemological issues have overridden those concerned with the experience of diverse social groups and different historical periods."⁸ So perhaps it is understandable that, apart from Rose, the other Beyond historians pay little attention to cultural studies. 3

     I wonder, however, if the new cultural history has a roomier explanatory "back seat" than cultural studies, or if it is any better at avoiding "the vagueness of culture"? For her part, Rose draws on cultural studies work on "moral panics" over patterns of youth rebellion—for instance, Resistance through Rituals (1976)—to help her understand "why . . . women's open expressions of sexuality [are] recurrently linked in public discourse with images of societal moral decay and family breakdown." Noting the limitations of structuralist approaches, Rose finds in the work of Stuart Hall and the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies several preferable theoretical tools. Four main influences on cultural studies—Antonio Gramsci, Mikhail Bakhtin, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu—all provide ways "to understand continuities and transformations in moral discourse that make possible a more historical view of how culture works than do . . . structuralist models."⁹ 4

     At least Rose seems more willing than the editors of Beyond to view cultural studies as a main source of methods and theories for cultural history. Further, if "causal explanation" in cultural studies "takes a back seat . . . to the demystification and deconstruction of power," that is also the case in cultural history, which upon any definition deals with "contests . . . over symbolic power." This is not to say that Bonnell and Hunt do not agree with that proposition. But, rather than to cultural studies, they turn to anthropology (and to some extent, sociology) for support. This preference perhaps expresses the sort of "science envy" that Ronald Grigor Suny notes in his discipline, political science.¹⁰ The wish for scientific legitimacy (or certainty) perhaps affects all historical and social science disciplines, including cultural studies but also anthropology. In part, the cultural turn in any discipline entails a weakening or renunciation of that wish. 5

     As Suny suggests, among the British Marxists such as E. P. Thompson and Raymond Williams, who helped establish cultural studies as in some sense a counter-discipline, the turn to culture was simultaneously a return to "the radical historicism in Marxism."¹¹ They rejected the theoretical reductionisms they saw both in mechanistic applications of the base-superstructure paradigm and in Althusserian structuralist Marxism in favor of a renewed sense of the complexities and contingencies of historical processes and of the indeterminate significance of human agency (summed up in the concept of "experience"). And through the 1960s and 1970s, the Gramscian notion of "hegemony" served to denote the attempt, at least, in much cultural studies work, to avoid reductionist (albeit supposedly scientific) patterns of analysis. 6

     The question of legitimating cultural studies reached a reductio ad absurdum with "the Sokal hoax," which Margaret C. Jacob cites in her contribution to Beyond. Jacob notes that physicist Alan Sokal intended his 1996 article in Social Text to be "a spoof on the fields of science studies and cultural studies where they are indebted to deconstruction and French theory." The Social Text "fracas" dramatized the fact that every step in the development of science studies has "resembled trench warfare."¹² Both older and much more varied in its approaches and topics than science studies, cultural studies perhaps escaped some of the bad publicity generated by the Sokal hoax.¹³ 7

     But can appeals to anthropology help legitimate either cultural studies or the new cultural history? For one thing, as Richard Handler points out, the sorts of distinctions the editors of Beyond wish to maintain between society and culture and practice and representation are not supported by "Boasian" anthropology.¹⁴ For another, while nineteenth-century anthropology made culture one of its two central focuses, the other was the physical differences between the races of mankind. Until World War I, many anthropologists believed that race was a causal factor that helped to explain cultural differences. With the rejection of evolutionary and racial assumptions, modern anthropology grew increasingly relativist even as it turned structuralist. That relativism has reached a climax (abyss?) with the impact of poststructuralism, which has landed anthropology in the same epistemological difficulties as science studies, cultural studies, and the new cultural history. 8

     For historiography, those difficulties can paradoxically be understood as its undermining (or culturalization) by anthropology. Instead of the latter providing scientific legitimacy to the former, something like the reverse is at work in Marshall Sahlins's claim that historians, in contrast to anthropologists, "devalue the unique event in favor of underlying recurrent structures." Sahlins proceeds: "paradoxically, anthropologists are as often diachronic in outlook as historians nowadays are synchronic. Nor is the issue . . . merely about the value of collaboration. The problem now is to explode the concept of history by the anthropological experience of culture."¹⁵ Sahlins has in mind Eurocentric historiographic assumptions that posit universal structures "underlying" all cultures and societies. In contrast, at least in its poststructuralist mode, anthropology reveals "diverse," perhaps incommensurate structures. But such universalizing assumptions the Beyond historians also reject. 9

     In cultural studies, and first in the work of both Williams and Thompson, the focus on culture as "experience," "community," and "class consciousness" resulted partially from recognizing the inadequacy of the base-superstructure model or economic determinism. By now, there have been so many arguments that superstructural factors influence substructures—or, in other words, that the more or less separate spheres of economics, politics, social structure, and culture interact in complex, overdetermined ways—that the result is perforce a turn or return to culture.¹⁶ Rather than a discrete category, level, or sphere, "culture" comes to mean the resultant stew when the various categories are viewed as interacting in complex, reciprocal ways. Not "culture is ordinary," as Williams insisted in a 1958 lecture, and as the cultural studies focus on "everyday life" has continued to insist; instead, culture is everything: there is nothing that is not culture—a totalizing definition that (like other totalizing definitions of society, ideology, or history) excludes nothing and, hence, explains nothing.¹⁷ 10

     So what can the reasonable cultural historian do but enjoy the stew and—Clifford Geertz to the rescue!—add to it by providing a "thick description" of it? As Richard Biernacki suggests, Geertz is helpful but not because "thick description" lends theoretical support to the historian.¹⁸ Although that phrase sounds theoretical, what it offers is a pragmatic excuse for the anthropologist or the historian to go on doing what she is good at doing: thickly describing foreign or past cultures. After its reduction of various alternative theories to the almost nontheoretical stew of Gramscian hegemony, cultural studies also proceeds with thick description. The issue becomes the search for "resistance" within the stew: in any given cultural formation, whatever is not hegemonic must be resistant, and vice-versa.¹⁹ 11

     For the Beyond historians, Geertz is a favorite.²⁰ But I doubt that he adds scientific legitimacy to the new cultural history, especially in light of Lynn Hunt's observation in her 1989 anthology that "Geertz's own increasingly literary understanding of meaning (the construing of cultural meaning as a text to be read) has fundamentally reshaped current directions in anthropological self-reflection."²¹ The new "literary understanding" among anthropologists reaches one extreme in Stephen Tyler's "post-modern ethnography." Tyler rejects the pursuit of "universal knowledge" and "representation" in favor of a deconstructive "cultural poetics" that aligns him with the new historicism rather than with anything that could still be understood as scientific.²² If the new cultural history recognizes the importance of both culture and anthropology, the new anthropology recognizes the force of the literary, or at any rate of poststructuralist literary theory. True, the Beyond historians also recognize what William H. Sewell, Jr., refers to as "the pervasive transdisciplinary influence of the French poststructuralist trinity of Lacan, Derrida, and Foucault."²³ But because it deconstructs scientific objectivity and universality in both the social sciences and historiography, poststructuralism, even as it provides theoretical insight, undermines aspirations for scientific legitimacy. 12

     Though itself as much a response to as the cause of the postmodern epistemological crisis that Jean-François Lyotard calls "incredulity toward metanarratives," poststructuralism has been crucial to debates within cultural studies that have helped make that movement a major arena for the productive "clash and criss-crossing" of theories of diverse sorts—Marxist, structuralist, psychoanalytic, feminist, postcolonialist, as well as poststructuralist.²⁴ Nor is it the case that either inattention to "causal explanation" or a lack of rigor in confronting "the vagueness of culture" renders cultural studies less than useful for any project a cultural historian undertakes. All of the theories I listed have implications, at least, for "causal explanation." But it may also be just the sheer, inconclusive eclecticism of theories, plural, that leads Bonnell and Hunt to treat cultural studies rather dismissively. Then again, as Pickering suggests, perhaps it is the recent tendency in much cultural studies work on the mass media to foreshorten the "historical dimension" that makes it not especially useful to the (new) cultural historian. 13

     Something similar happens in Beyond to the new historicism, which shares with cultural studies a theoretical eclecticism that its practitioners like to construe as pragmatic and even anti-theoretical.²⁵ The new cultural history of the Beyond historians, displacing what Peter Burke calls the "classical" variety, may be "anthropological," but its practitioners "have also learned much from literary critics like the 'new historicists' in the USA."²⁶ So, too, in his contribution to Hunt's 1989 anthology, Lloyd Kramer writes: "The one truly distinguishing feature of the new cultural approach to history is the pervasive influence of recent literary criticism, which has taught historians to recognize the active role of language, texts, and narrative structures in the creation and description of historical reality."²⁷ This is not literature (or literary criticism) in its classical, idealist mode, however; it is instead literature with the force of the ordinary, or in other words writ large as discourse, representation, textuality, or culture. For if everything is cultural, then it is also literary, because "there is nothing outside the text."²⁸ And historiography, too, as Hayden White insists, is in various ways more literary than many historians care to admit. 14

     But while Beyond foregrounds the new cultural history, the new historicism is mentioned just twice. Though eager to claim interdisciplinary affiliations with anthropology and sociology, the Beyond historians do not seem eager to claim Stephen Greenblatt and his followers except perhaps as "literary" fellow travelers. Thus Sewell identifies both Greenblatt and Louis Montrose as "critics" and practitioners of "literary study" but not as cultural historians.²⁹ My hunch is that the new historicists (most of whom are members of literature rather than history departments) have gone too far in the poststructuralist direction of indeterminacy—or, more paradoxically, of "radical historicism"—for the Beyond historians to follow. Can you be a poststructuralist and still be a historian? Can you be a "radical historicist" and still be a historian? "Historians and sociologists," write Bonnell and Hunt, "have been . . . receptive to the cultural turn without embracing, however, the most extreme relativist or anti-positivist arguments of anthropologists or literary scholars"—or, one might add, of "radical historicism."³⁰ 15

     No more than the new cultural history is the new historicism exactly new. Tentatively calling himself a new historicist, Brook Thomas declared in 1990 that a movement centered around Greenblatt and Representations was "old-fashioned." This he did in The New Historicism and Other Old-Fashioned Topics, wherein he argued that, despite the influence of Foucault and other French poststructuralists, the new historicism's real (or more real) affinities lie with the American pragmatist tradition and such early twentieth-century cultural historians as James Harvey Robinson and Charles and Mary Beard. Of course, Greenblatt and company have not been claiming that historicism is new, only that their version of it is new. But perhaps their basic though undeclared allegiance is to a cultural historiography that literary scholars used to practice, before the New Criticism, structuralism, and poststructuralism intervened.³¹ In any event, the new historicists are also sympathetic to versions of (Western) Marxism and cultural studies, even while their preference has been for Foucault over Marx. 16

     According to its critics (including many of its practitioners), the new historicism has been both loosely eclectic and less than systematic. Greenblatt, Montrose, and the others, it is said, abandon attempts at rigorous fact-gathering and causal explanation in favor of "anecdotes" and the trains of association they suggest. Certainly, the new historicism, as befits a movement originating within literature departments, emphasizes hermeneutics or the interpretation of texts rather than facticity and cause-and-effect logic. And often, the texts are singular, canonical works of literature or else stories that seem randomly chosen. According to new historicist Alan Liu: "Where history of ideas straightened the world pictures, Elizabethan or otherwise, New Historicism hangs those pictures anew—seemingly by accident, off any hook, at any angle."³² To be meaningful, an anecdote or "picture" must be situated in a context such as a "world picture," of course. But the new historicist starting point is frequently some petit récit or micronarrative from which the interpretive context seems more or less arbitrarily to sprout.³³ 17

     The new cultural history also emphasizes hermeneutics over causal explanation. With "the collapse of explanatory paradigms" in the social sciences, Bonnell and Hunt declare, the result has been increasing emphasis on "interpretive" strategies, "cultural contexts," and even on "singular stories and places, what the Italians call microstoria, microhistory."³⁴ This sounds close, at least, to the more programmatic statements of the new historicists.³⁵ Moreover, if anything, the contributors to Beyond go further than the new historicists in claiming that historiography is not merely literary but always at least as fictional as it is factual. Thus, in her contribution to Beyond, "Cultural History and the Challenge of Narrativity," Karen Halttunen cites a number of recent cultural historians who insist on the narrative and fictive properties of historiography: besides both Hayden White and Foucault, she has in mind Natalie Zemon Davis, John Demos, and Simon Schama, among others. Perhaps the main theoretical shift evident in the writings of these and other neo-cultural historians is a final dispelling of the illusion that historiography can ever be more science than art. After all, are Schama's or Greenblatt's procedures much different from, say, those of Thomas Carlyle or Thomas B. Macaulay? 18

     Chronicling the immorality of the stage, the influence of coffee houses, and the advent of street lighting in London during the late seventeenth century, Macaulay was operating as a cultural historian. Further, by taking Sir Walter Scott as a model, Macaulay insisted that history writing was more art than science, although I doubt that he believed it to be more fictive than factual. On the other hand, Macaulay was much more inclined than we are today to claim Scott's novels as reliable works of history: "Scott . . . has used those fragments of truth which historians have scornfully thrown behind them in a manner which may well excite their envy. He has constructed out of their gleanings works which, even considered as histories, are scarcely less valuable than theirs."³⁶ By "fragments of truth" and "gleanings," Macaulay meant the customs, habits, and beliefs "of the people"—that is, the common culture—that political historians such as Lord Clarendon and David Hume ignored: "a truly great historian would reclaim those materials which the novelist has appropriated. The history of the government, and the history of the people, would be exhibited in that mode in which alone they can be exhibited justly, in inseparable conjunction and intermixture."³⁷ If the historian followed Scott's lead, Macaulay declared, "The early part of our imaginary history would be rich with colouring from romance, ballad, and chronicle." Just what he meant by "imaginary history" is uncertain, although he clearly did not mean that such history was merely fictional in the sense of nonfactual or unreal. In any event, through novelistic means, "Society would be shown from the highest to the lowest—from the royal cloth of state to the den of the outlaw; from the throne of the legate to the chimney-corner where the begging friar regaled himself"—just as Scott seemed to portray past society in its totality.³⁸ 19

     Whatever their historical value as models of a sociological completeness that Macaulay believed historians should imitate, Scott's novels are in several ways, to use Dominick LaCapra's term, "worklike." While popular or mass-cultural texts provide certain sorts of evidence about the beliefs and values of their producers and consumers, LaCapra contends that high-cultural texts such as Gustave Flaubert's Madame Bovary provide different sorts of evidence. As an intellectual historian, LaCapra perhaps shares with literary and art historians the idealist tendency to author worship—what Roland Barthes might call the "Einstein's brain" approach.³⁹ However, LaCapra argues, all texts are not merely "documentary," they are also more or less "worklike." And sometimes, at least, worklike texts are historically powerful ones—Scott's novels, the Communist Manifesto, Madame Bovary, Darwin's Origin of Species. Such texts are themselves historical events of greater or lesser magnitude. In common with cultural historians, intellectual historians emphasize the cultural shaping of intellectuals and such collective categories as contexts, schools, disciplines, traditions, and "systems of thought."⁴⁰ Rather than Einstein's brain taken as heroically unique and self-sufficient, the question becomes, what are the cultural, historical factors that shaped Einstein's ideas and texts? But even as historians stress collective factors, certain individuals and their worklike texts continue to be more influential than others in the shaping of cultures and their "world pictures." 20

     Moreover, any text, even an anecdote, is a complicated affair, as Roger Chartier notes: "Texts are not deposited in objects—manuscripts or printed books—that contain them like receptacles, and they are not inscribed in readers as in soft wax."⁴¹ Rather, as its etymology suggests, a text is a discursive weaving, a "clash and criss-crossing" from which interpretations and meanings proliferate. The "history of the book" is therefore not just about the material production of a bound, handwritten or printed object but is necessarily about the production and proliferation of meanings, interpretations, and values. If a text is always both a fact and an event, it is also always in excess of those seemingly bound or boundaried concepts. In Practicing New Historicism (2000), Gallagher and Greenblatt declare: "If an entire culture is regarded as a text, then everything is at least potentially in play both at the level of representation and at the level of event. Indeed, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain a clear, unambiguous boundary between what is representation and what is event. At the very least, the drawing or maintaining of that boundary is itself an event."⁴² 21

     If "the cultural turn" that has given rise to cultural studies, the new historicism, and the new cultural history expresses the postmodern "incredulity" that any theory or metanarrative will ever suffice to deal with the difficulties of culture, Fredric Jameson's famous injunction, "Always historicize!" appears to be the only possible response.⁴³ And to historicize means both to thickly describe and to contextualize, because, as Geertz declares, culture is not "something to which social events . . . or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly—that is, thickly—described."⁴⁴ Besides distinguishing between "documentary" and "worklike" aspects of texts, LaCapra provides a useful taxonomy of cultural contexts. A given text can be read in relation to its "author's intentions"; its "author's life"; society; culture; the other texts produced by the author; and "modes of discourse" such as literary genres or "history" versus "literature."⁴⁵ 22

     While distinguishing among types of contexts, LaCapra emphasizes that they overlap in a variety of ways. No absolute boundaries can be drawn between a text and its interpretations, or between society, culture, and modes of discourse. "Analytic distinctions such as those drawn between history and literature, fact and fiction, concept and metaphor, LaCapra writes, "do not define realms of discourse that unproblematically . . . govern extended uses of language." LaCapra adds that, while "it is common to distinguish history from literature on the grounds that history is concerned with the realm of fact while literature moves in the realm of fiction," this distinction also is by no means absolute.⁴⁶ 23

     Despite New Critical and more recent attempts to reduce the job of the interpreter to the intrinsically textual, the interpretation of any text always entails contextualization. A literary canon is a context, and so are the generic conventions of, say, elegies. Not even so "professionally correct" a literary critic as Stanley Fish can read John Milton's Lycidas without referring to such contexts.⁴⁷ Further, great, worklike, canonical texts are, as LaCapra notes, typically in "conversation" or "dialogue" with "general or popular culture."⁴⁸ Bakhtin's analysis of both "dialogue" and "carnival" suggests that the division between popular and elite cultural forms is one major context through which economic, social, and political power has been both expressed and contested in all civilizations, past and present. The "great divide," as Andreas Huyssen has called it, between high and popular or mass cultural values and forms is a distinguishing feature not just of modernity. Nor, contra Huyssen, has that "divide" disappeared with the advent of postmodernity. Bourdieu's analysis of cultural "distinction" suggests that "taste" or value hierarchies will disappear only if and when social classes disappear. Both the hierarchies and social classes are subject to change, of course. But Rose's "contests . . . over symbolic power" remain a central subject of cultural studies as also of cultural history.⁴⁹ 24

     Perhaps all cultures are, as Sewell claims, "contradictory . . . loosely integrated . . . contested . . . subject to constant change . . . [and] weakly bounded."⁵⁰ This is certainly the case with both modern and now postmodern cultures. But Sewell draws no line between primitive and civilized cultures. These properties or, perhaps, anti-properties of culture make it difficult or maybe impossible, except in specific cases (calling for thick description), to establish causal relations among different aspects or spheres of cultures. They also make it difficult to establish what constitutes a fact for cultural history. Of course, what counts as a fact for a cultural historian may not count as one for, say, an economic historian. That difference illustrates, in a small way, "contests . . . over symbolic power." 25

     In History of the Modern Fact, Mary Poovey shows how what most historians and scientists have understood as the solid building-block of knowledge has been culturally constructed from the Renaissance on. She also shows that deconstructions of facticity occurred long before the advent of poststructuralism.⁵¹ Poovey focuses on the epistemological ruminations of Hume, Adam Smith, and other representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume's questioning of causation and objectivity reached a skeptical cul-de-sac for philosophy, but it led him to develop a sociable sophistication that affirmed the centrality of taste and refinement to the "liberal governmentality" that characterizes modern social formations. In other words, Hume also took a "cultural turn" away from ontology and epistemology toward the emergent axiological discourses of aesthetics and economics. 26

     Aesthetics leads on to the literary and to literary criticism and theory. In contrast, economics, the first modern social science, could claim to be scientific because it made counting of a strictly secular, non-theological, non-Platonic sort central to its disciplinary apparatus. The "modern fact" is the historical product of the application of numbers to the observed phenomena of natural and social experience, starting with Renaissance merchants' double-entry account books. One reason for the power that comes from quantifying experience is that numbers appear to "solve the problem of induction" by at least seeming to "bridge the gap between the observed particular and general knowledge."⁵² A second reason is that certain forms of public enumeration—census taking, tax accounting, and so on—are indispensable to modern governments. But numbers tend to reify social processes and "conflicts . . . over symbolic capital"—statistics as a version of what Alexis de Tocqueville called "the tyranny of the majority." 27

     These epistemological and political issues make it imperative to recognize the limits of economics and the other social sciences—including "cliometric," positivist versions of historiography—which claim to be value-free and entirely fact-based; which also claim to render social experience in mathematized terms that privilege "quantity over quality and equivalence over difference"⁵³ ; and which have had a massive influence on modern and now postmodern governmentality, whether liberal or otherwise. One attraction that the new cultural history shares with both cultural studies and the new historicism is incredulity toward positivist models of objectivity that seek to convert quality into quantity and interpretive modesty into facticity. The cultural turn, Hayden White declares, "means a radical questioning of every science claiming to have a direct and unmotivated access to whatever reality is supposed to consist of."⁵⁴ And another attraction is, at least from the standpoint of literary scholars, the recognition not only of the cultural or textual basis of evidence but of the special (albeit not necessarily classical or canonical) status that, at least in some circumstances, accrues to worklike texts. 28

     There is a hint of nostalgia about the new cultural history. Perhaps this is true of every enterprise that claims to have turned a corner: venturing "beyond" evokes the desire to return. Bonnell and Hunt cite Laurie Nussdorfer, who writes, "it may be quite some time before . . . we have something to replace the great lost paradigms of the postwar era." This is to say, Bonnell and Hunt continue, that "the cultural turn" in history writing has "raised more questions than it could answer."⁵⁵ But question-raising is a result of every important intellectual, academic, cultural turn, even as the proliferation of questions arouses both controversy and nostalgia. The new cultural historians recognize, however, that there can be no return to "the great lost paradigms." But perhaps that is cause for celebration: the new cultural history rejects what Friedrich Nietzsche called "that admiration for the 'power of history' which in practice transforms every moment into a naked admiration for success and leads to an idolatry of the factual."⁵⁶ In Beyond the Cultural Turn, "culture" is a term that, for all its difficulties, questions facticity even as it infuses history with a sense of potential—with contingency but also with a certain difficult affirmation of human agency. 29

The editor of Victorian Studies from 1980 to 1990, Patrick Brantlinger is James Rudy and College Alumni Association Distinguished Professor of English at Indiana University. His most recent books are The Reading Lesson: The Threat of Mass Literacy in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction (1998) and Who Killed Shakespeare? What's Happened to English since the Radical Sixties (2001). He is co-editor with William B. Thesing of Blackwell's Companion to the Victorian Novel (2002). His Dark Vanishings: Discourse about the Extinction of Primitive Races, 1800–1930 is forthcoming next year from Cornell University Press.

Notes

¹ Raymond Williams, Politics and Letters: Interviews with New Left Review (London, 1979), 154.
² Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, 1780–1950 (New York, 1958); compare Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture, Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds. (Berkeley, Calif., 1999), 39.
³ V. N. Voloinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik, trans. (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 41.
⁴ Sonya O. Rose, "Cultural Analysis and Moral Discourses: Episodes, Continuities, and Transformations," in Bonnell and Hunt, Beyond the Cultural Turn, 221.
⁵ Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, introduction, Beyond the Cultural Turn, 11–12.
⁶ So, too, William H. Sewell, Jr., reduces cultural studies to its least interesting instances. Its "particular mission," he writes, is "the appreciation of cultural forms disdained by the spokesmen of high culture." Sewell, "The Concept(s) of Culture," in Bonnell and Hunt, Beyond the Cultural Turn, 42.
⁷ Michael Pickering, History, Experience and Cultural Studies (London, 1997), 1; Patrick Brantlinger, Crusoe's Footprints: Cultural Studies in Britain and America (New York, 1990), 34–67.
⁸ Pickering, History, Experience and Cultural Studies, 3.
⁹ Rose, "Cultural Analysis and Moral Discourses," 227, 228.
¹⁰ Ronald Grigor Suny, "Back and Beyond: Reversing the Cultural Turn?" AHR 107 (December 2002): 1491.
¹¹ Suny, "Back and Beyond," 1481.
¹² Margaret C. Jacob, "Science Studies after Social Construction: The Turn toward the Comparative and the Global," in Bonnell and Hunt, Beyond the Cultural Turn, 98–99.
¹³ Although science studies is sometimes treated as a specialization or subfield within cultural studies (which is apparently how Sokal viewed it), it has its own protocols, practitioners, and venues. One item it shares with both cultural studies and the new cultural history is the assumption that cultural and social factors "construct" all discourses, including scientific ones. In other words, neither scientific methods nor results transcend cultural contexts and the shaping power of history.
¹⁴ Richard Handler, "Cultural Theory in History Today," AHR 107 (December 2002): 1513.
¹⁵ Marshall Sahlins, Islands of History (Chicago, 1987), 72.
¹⁶ Bonnell and Hunt, Beyond the Cultural Turn, 26; Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," in Problems in Materialism and Culture (London, 1980), 31–49.
¹⁷ Raymond Williams, "Culture Is Ordinary," in Williams, Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism (London, 1989), 3–18.
¹⁸ Richard Biernacki, "Method and Metaphor after the New Cultural History," in Bonnell and Hunt, Beyond the Cultural Turn, 63–64.
¹⁹ I am, of course, parodying—but not by much—a tendency within cultural studies. (The parody does not do justice to more complex, theoretical treatments of hegemony by, for example, Williams and Hall.)
²⁰ That Geertz serves in Beyond as the synecdoche for anthropology is evident from the not always reliable index: Geertz is cited some two dozen times, compared to only four for Claude Lévi-Strauss and three each for James Clifford and Marshall Sahlins.
²¹ Lynn Hunt, ed., The New Cultural History (Berkeley, Calif., 1989), 13.
²² Stephen Tyler, "Post-Modern Ethnography: From Document of the Occult to Occult Document," in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds. (Berkeley, Calif., 1986), 125–26. For awhile, at least, Stephen Greenblatt rejected the phrase "new historicism," in favor of "cultural poetics." See Greenblatt, "Towards a Poetics of Culture," in H. Aram Veeser, ed., The New Historicism (New York, 1989), 1–14.
²³ Sewell, "Concept(s) of Culture," 37.
²⁴ Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis, Minn., 1988), xxiv.
²⁵ For the relations between cultural studies and the new historicism, see John Brannigan, New Historicism and Cultural Materialism (New York, 1998); and Kiernan Ryan, ed., New Historicism and Cultural Materialism: A Reader (London, 1996); and also Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, Practicing New Historicism (Chicago, 2000), 54–66.
²⁶ Peter Burke, Varieties of Cultural History (Ithaca, N.Y., 1997), 192.
²⁷ Lloyd Kramer, "Literature, Criticism, and Historical Imagination: The Literary Challenge of Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra," in Hunt, New Cultural History, 97–98.
²⁸ Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Gayatri Spivak, trans. (Baltimore, Md., 1976), 158; Sewell, "Concept(s) of Culture," 36.
²⁹ Sewell, "Concept(s) of Culture," 36.
³⁰ Bonnell and Hunt, introduction, 4.
³¹ I am thinking, for instance, of Lionel Trilling, Edmund Wilson, Perry Miller, and F. O. Mathiessen, as well as of E. P. Thompson and Raymond Williams. See Brantlinger, Crusoe's Footprints, 26–33; and also Gerald Graff, Professing Literature: An Institutional History (Chicago, 1997), 209–25.
³² Alan Liu, "The Power of Formalism: The New Historicism," English Literary History 56 (1989): 721–71.
³³ In Practicing New Historicism, Gallagher and Greenblatt defend attention to the "anecdote" as a way of writing Foucauldian "counter-history" (pp. 49–74 and passim). At the very least, the stress on contingency that the anecdotal introduces has the negative value of making standard, straightforward, teleological historical narratives difficult or impossible to construct or credit. In doing so, new historicists express Derrida's rejection of "the metaphysical concept of history. This is the concept of history as the history of meaning . . . developing itself, producing itself, fulfilling itself. And doing so linearly . . . in a straight or circular line." Jacques Derrida, Positions, Alan Bass, trans. (Chicago, 1981), 56.
³⁴ Bonnell and Hunt, introduction, 1–10.
³⁵ Such statements are infrequent, but see Gallagher and Greenblatt, Practicing New Historicism, 1–19; and H. Aram Veeser, "Introduction," New Historicism, xi.
³⁶ Thomas Babington Macaulay, "History" ["The Romance of History," 1828], rpt. in Fritz Stern, ed., The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present (Cleveland, Ohio, 1966), 86–87.
³⁷ Macaulay, "History," 87.
³⁸ Macaulay, "History," 87.
³⁹ Dominick LaCapra, Madame Bovary on Trial (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982). Albert Einstein (or his brain) "fulfils all the conditions of myth, which could not care less about contradictions so long as it establishes a euphoric security: at once magician and machine, eternal researcher and unfulfilled discoverer, unleashing the best and the worst, brain and conscience, Einstein embodies the most contradictory dreams, and mythically reconciles the infinite power of man over nature with the 'fatality' of the sacrosanct." Roland Barthes, "The Brain of Einstein," in Barthes, Mythologies, Annette Lavers, trans. (New York, 1979), 70.
⁴⁰ Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977), 199–204.
⁴¹ Roger Chartier, Cultural History: Between Practices and Representations (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988), 12.
⁴² Gallagher and Greenblatt, Practicing New Historicism, 15.
⁴³ Frederic Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca, N.Y., 1981), 9.
⁴⁴ Clifford Geertz, quoted in Bonnell and Hunt, Beyond the Cultural Turn, 64.
⁴⁵ LaCapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts." Still another context that LaCapra mentions, though he does not analyze it with the others, is the present situation of the historian.
⁴⁶ LaCapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts." LaCapra writes: "It is true that the historian may not invent his facts or references while the 'literary' writer may, and in this respect the latter has a greater margin of freedom in exploring relationships. But, on other levels, historians make use of heuristic fictions, counterfactuals, and models to orient their research into facts . . . Conversely, literature borrows from a factual repertoire in multiple ways [that invalidate] attempts to see literature in terms of a pure suspension of reference to 'reality' or transcendence of the empirical into the purely imaginary" (p. 57).
⁴⁷ I have in mind Stanley Fish's critique of both cultural studies and the new historicism in his Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political Change (Cambridge, Mass., 1995) and elsewhere, as well as René Wellek and Austin Warren's assault on "extrinsic" contexts as irrelevant to the interpretation of literary texts in Theory of Literature (New York, 1949).
⁴⁸ LaCapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts," 52.
⁴⁹ Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington, Ind., 1986). "The primary business of culture," writes John Frow, "is distinction, the stratification of tastes in such a way as to construct and reinforce differentiations of social status which correspond, in historically variable and often highly mediated ways, to achieved or aspired-to class position" (his italics). Nonetheless, Frow continues, "Whereas in highly stratified societies culture is closely tied to class structure, in most advanced capitalist societies the cultural system is no longer organized in a strict hierarchy and is no longer in the same manner tense with the play of power." Frow, Cultural Studies and Cultural Value (Oxford, 1995), 85, his italics.
⁵⁰ Sewell, "Concept(s) of Culture," 53–54.
⁵¹ Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago, 1998). In this regard, Hume, who believed the "self" to be a "prejudice," could easily take his place among the thinkers whom Jerrold Seigel discusses as "problematizing the self" in his contribution, "Problematizing the Self," in Bonnell and Hunt, Beyond the Cultural Turn, 281–314.
⁵² Poovey, History of the Modern Fact, 286. As Poovey, John Stuart Mill, David Hume, and many other analysts have understood, enumeration is only ever an approximation to a solution of the problem of induction; it is necessarily based on probability—the chance rather than absolute certainty that, for instance, the next observed particular in a statistical series will be like all or at least most of the previous ones. As John Herschel put it in his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (1830), there will be a "necessary . . . numerical error in every observation," no matter how exact, which can only be compensated for by taking it into account as the "latitude" or margin of error for that observation (cited by Poovey, 319).
⁵³ Poovey, History of the Modern Fact, 4.
⁵⁴ Hayden White, "Afterword," in Bonnell and Hunt, Beyond the Cultural Turn, 321.
⁵⁵ Bonnell and Hunt, introduction, 30 n. 19.
⁵⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, R. J. Hollingdale, trans. (Cambridge, 1983), 105.

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