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| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 107.3 | The History Cooperative
107.3  
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June, 2002
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Book Review

Comparative/World


Richard J. Aldrich. The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence. London: John Murray. 2001. Pp. xv, 733. £25.00.

Whatever else it was, the intelligence apparatus of the Cold War was a vast bureaucracy, with the institutional imperatives and incentive structures of bureaucracies everywhere. Indeed, the intelligence bureaucracies may have exhibited the properties of the genus in purest form, shielded as they were from the intrusive oversight of parliamentarians and other representatives of the ordinary folk who footed the bills. 1
     Richard J. Aldrich did not set out to write an organizational history of intelligence, and in fact his formidable volume is a great deal more. Yet the strongest impression the reader takes away is that the cloaks of the cloak-and-dagger crew were really gray flannel suits, and that the daggers flashed as swift and sharp against the agents of rival offices at home as against the spies of the other side. "Since we are, in fact, deceiving both the Soviets and our Allies with regard to our nuclear capability," Aldrich quotes the British Joint Planning Staff, "it is essential that any questions on deception plans . . . be handled with great reserve" (p. 371). . . .


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