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| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 107.2 | The History Cooperative
107.2  
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April, 2002
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Book Review


Comparative/World


Kevin Ruane. The Rise and Fall of the European Defense Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defense, 1950–55. (Cold War History Series.) New York: Palgrave. 2000. Pp. ix, 252. $65.00.

As Western leaders shifted to perceiving the USSR as more threatening than Germany, they concurrently sought via economic and military/political integration to dampen the intra-European rivalries that had sparked two world wars. But Anglo-American determination to bolster European defense by rearming Germany intersected awkwardly with the quest for supranational decision-making institutions. French pride, insecurity, instability, and indecisiveness challenged German rearmament and supranational defense institutions, with potentially disastrous consequences for European defense and transatlantic relations. Kevin Ruane's extended case study discusses how British and American leaders responded to French reluctance to embrace the European Defense Community (EDC) (and even to vote on it), to the EDC's eventual rejection, and to one another's responses. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had threatened an "agonizing reappraisal" of military deployment should France reject the EDC. British policy makers recognized that while German manpower was necessary, American military capability was even more essential. This book analyzes how Britain—especially Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden—worked to preserve the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Western security, and transatlantic relations. Thus Ruane contributes not only to our understanding of the 1954 EDC crisis but elaborates on the scholarship of David Reynolds and others: the reassessment of the mythical "special relationship" continues. . . .


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