Book Review

Asia

Recent years have witnessed the lively development of Qing dynasty (1644–1912) historical studies, much of it stimulated by the opening of the Qing archives in Beijing and their rich font of new materials for the study of Qing history. In this book, James A. Millward draws extensively on these archival materials to focus on the dynasty's relations with Xinjiang, a predominantly Muslim region that is geographically part of Inner Asia, defined here as including Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and East Turkestan (the present Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region of China). Millward's detailed discussion of Qing fiscal and ethnic policy in Xinjiang adds to the ongoing reassessment of the distinctive nature of China's last foreign dynasty, its ruling Manchu elite, and the empire they created through conquest of Ming dynasty (1368–1644) lands and Inner Asia. Although not all of the arguments put forward are equally persuasive, the book well rewards the diligent reader.	1
Millward begins by asking why Qing empire building has remained a neglected subject of historical enquiry. The answer, he proposes, lies in the domination of mid-twentieth-century Chinese historiography by scholars who viewed China beyond the Great Wall as also being beyond the boundaries of "proper" Chinese history. His critique of Owen Lattimore, John King Fairbank, and Joseph Fletcher is somewhat disingenuous, as these pioneers of Chinese history in America had no access to the Qing archives that have clearly stimulated a re-thinking of China's relations with Inner Asia. Nonetheless, Millward's discussion does provide a survey of earlier interpretations of the Qing and leads the reader into his treatment of new interpretations of the Manchu world. Here Millward follows Pamela Kyle Crossley, whose own recent archival work has led her to view the Manchu-ruled Qing as an Inner Asian empire rather than as a Chinese dynasty. Millward provides new support for this interpretation by examining two central aspects of Qing rule in Xinjiang: economic policy, which aimed at financial self-sufficiency for the newly conquered region; and ethnic policy, which sought to neutralize any possible nomad threat to the dynasty on its northwestern borders.	2
Regarding the first, Millward uses financial records to show that, following the 1759 conquest, East Turkestan required an annual subsidy that grew year by year. To make the region at least self-supporting, the court encouraged Manchu and Han officials to develop creative financing methods, including military-run pawn shops, rental properties, and the more conventional sale of government stores of tea and silk. The story of these enterprises, as told in chapter three, is a fascinating one, and it supports the view that the Qing empire did not follow Chinese precedents but instead forged its own policies in Inner Asia.	3
Subsequent chapters chart in careful detail the gradual expansion of Chinese traders into Xinjiang on the heels of the conquest and trace initial efforts of the court to limit their potentially negative impact. This provides further support for the emerging view among Qing scholars that the Manchus did not privilege one group of subjects over another. Instead, as Evelyn Rawski and Crossley also have suggested, the Manchus viewed themselves as rulers of all China's diverse peoples and, at least in the eighteenth century, sought to limit Chinese influence throughout its Inner Asian realms.	4
Evaluation of Manchu intentions and policies raises a question of particular importance in Xinjiang today: can the Qing can be viewed as an imperialist, colonialist power? Here much is at stake, as Muslim Uyghurs and Kazakhs begin to interpret the past in ways that bolster their increasingly restless nationalism. In China's contest to maintain control of both history and its discontented populations, interpreting the Qing empire is a matter of considerable consequence.	. . .