|
|
|
On the Limits of Thomas Zeiler's Historiographical Triumphalism
Mario Del Pero
| "An era of innovation among historians of American foreign relations is upon us," proclaims Thomas W. Zeiler in the opening salvo of his comprehensive mapping of U.S. diplomatic historiography. Far from being the maladjusted nerds spending endless hours studying military clashes and diplomatic exchanges, historians of U.S. foreign relations—Zeiler claims—are now not simply an acceptable part of the herd, but indeed "an advance guard," actually "driving the bandwagon of internationalization."1 |
1
|
|
So much then for Zeiler's stated intent to avoid triumphalism. This is very much a triumphalist essay, and there are serious reasons for proclaiming victory, although Zeiler tends to overstate them and downplay some of the most evident shortcomings of U.S. diplomatic historiography. |
2
|
|
I agree with Zeiler when he underlines the relevance of the increasing "cross-fertilization between the larger discipline and diplomatic history" and the consequent demolition of once rigid, unassailable subdisciplinary bastions. Again, Zeiler goes a bit over the top when he presents this cross-fertilization as a form of "integration." Just a quick perusal of the programs of the last, say, five annual conferences of the Organization of American Historians belies such a bold statement: 2008 was a welcome exception, but in the previous four years there were very few panels on the history of U.S. foreign relations, even using the broad definition of the field proposed by Zeiler. Nevertheless, rapid advancements, unthinkable just a few years ago, have been made in the field, and perhaps the time has come to recognize and celebrate them. One is left wondering whether it still makes sense to talk of "diplomatic history" or even of "U.S. foreign relations" as fields. Zeiler himself poses that question. His response is to identify a very loose distinctive trait of the field: namely, the attention it continues to pay to the "presence of the state" and the way "power functions." Accordingly, emphasis on power and the role of state allows U.S. diplomatic history to preserve its soul and distinguish itself from other branches of modern history, while engaging in an intense dialogue and exchange with them. This dialogue, Zeiler maintains, is particularly evident in the three interdependent areas: "realism's engagement with ideology ..., the embrace of international history, and the study of culture and identity."2 |
3
|
|
Again, there is much to agree with in Zeiler's essay. Only the most unreconstructed realist would deny the importance of ideological factors in the study of international relations, particularly U.S. foreign relations. (One might add, however, that the importance of ideology is often more proclaimed than explained and examined; serious reflections on what ideology is and how it should be studied remain rare among scholars of the Cold War and of U.S. diplomatic history more generally.) Frequently invoked and solicited, the internationalization of the field has become a reality: we now have many impressive and pathbreaking multinational, multiarchival studies (the works of Odd Arne Westad, Piero Gleijeses, and Erez Manela immediately come to mind). The influence of foreign actors on U.S. policies and projects is now being studied and documented, although more by scholars outside the United States. Finally, new approaches and methodologies are being consistently applied to the study of U.S. foreign relations and have produced original works that have made the discipline sexier and more attractive among graduate and undergraduate students.3 |
. . . |
There are about 1131 more words in this article.
Please log in (or, if you are not yet an
authorized user, please go to the
User Setup page) to gain full access rights. Or if you're already logged in register your subscription.
|
