| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 94.4

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| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 94.4 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam: Or, How Not to Learn from the Past. Ed. by Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young. (New York: New Press, 2007. xii, 322 pp. $25.95, ISBN 978-1-59558-149-5.)
Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young assert in their introduction, "history is too important to be left to the manipulations of Washington think-tank theorists and their sponsors" (p. 15). The theorists in question are obvious, as the contributors to this volume deliver a devastating collective response to the neoconservatives who provided so much of the rationale and impetus for the latest U.S. imperial misadventure. While drawing useful comparisons to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the essays focus primarily on Iraq. They can be grouped into three broad categories— those addressing U.S. leaders, their policy positions, and the resulting actions; those assessing the composition and experience of the American fighting forces; and those examining the international community's responses to U.S. actions.	1
Gardner, Young, and their impressive group of collaborators provide a valuable comparative framework for understanding the U.S. dilemma in Iraq. In making the case for military intervention in Vietnam and Iraq, American leaders ignored or perverted intelligence that did not support their preferred policies. In both instances threats were manufactured to justify wars aimed at preserving U.S. regional dominance. Ironically, the neocons perceived Iraq under Saddam Hussein as an easy target rather than a threat. In neither case was the promotion of democracy truly central. Rather, the United States sought to enforce containment in Southeast Asia and to secure access to oil and military bases in Iraq. And Congress abdicated its foreign policy responsibilities to the executive in both conflicts.	. . .

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