| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 94.3

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| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 94.3 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

The Cold War after Stalin's Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace?. Ed. by Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. xxxiv, 318 pp. $69.95, ISBN 978-0-7425-5451-1.)
The essays in this work provide fresh evidence and evaluations contending that both Moscow and Washington missed a slim chance to end the Cold War after Joseph Stalin's death and then wasted enormous resources for three and a half decades. The editors have arranged the essays into four groupings: the United States and the Soviet Union after Stalin's death; cultural peace offensives; East-West coalitions; and assessing peaceful coexistence.	1
The authors demonstrate that whatever peace offerings the Kremlin presented, the White House was not buying. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his secretary of state John Foster Dulles believed Premier Georgi Malenkov's "peace offensive" was a ruse to wreck Western unity. Malenkov's two statements, made on March 9 and March 15, 1953, stressed there were no issues that they could not resolve peacefully. Eisenhower met Malenkov's challenge with his own two speeches: on April 16 and December 18, 1953. In them, he evaluated Malenkov's new line by proposing that the Soviet Union prove its intentions with deeds, not just words: for example, ending the Korean War; concluding an Austrian State Treaty; and releasing German prisoners of war. Dulles followed Eisenhower by introducing a new doctrine in January 1954: local defense reinforced by massive retaliation. The West's conventional forces, the administration believed, were not an adequate deterrent to Soviet ground forces, unless they rearmed Germany.	. . .

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