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| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 94.2 | The History Cooperative
94.2  
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September, 2007
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Book Review



Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test–Ban Debate, 1945–1963. By Benjamin P. Greene. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007. xviii, 358 pp. $65.00, ISBN 978-0-8047-5445-3.)

Historians have always been perplexed by the apparent contradiction between Dwight D. Eisenhower's words and his policies about nuclear weapons. The words were full of warnings about the dangers of a spiraling arms race. The policies fueled that arms race, immensely increasing the size and lethal power of the U.S. arsenal while failing to achieve any agreement to limit the weapons or their testing. Any study of one aspect of Eisenhower's nuclear policies must inevitably confront (even if only implicitly) that paradox. Benjamin P. Greene's choice to study the test-ban issue makes sense, because during Eisenhower's presidency— especially in his second term—the testban became the principal symbolic focus for all efforts to reduce or regulate nuclear weaponry. . . .

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