| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 91.4

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| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 91.4 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971. By Francis J. Gavin. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. xvi, 263 pp. $45.00, ISBN 0-8078-2823-8.)
Persistent balance-of-payments deficits and gold outflows had an "enormous influence" (p. 7) on U.S. grand strategy during a critical phase of the Cold War, claims the historian Francis J. Gavin, who teaches in the Lyndon B. Johnson School at the University of Texas. This book, a revised doctoral dissertation, adheres to the traditional view that the Cold War was "the key geopolitical event" of the period (p. 11).	1
After explaining how the Bretton Woods arrangements required the United States to redeem dollars for gold, Gavin shows how balance-of-payments considerations impacted relations with France, Great Britain, and West Germany. As the U.S. deficit widened and foreigners accumulated dollar reserves, it became more difficult for the United States to meet gold redemption obligations from a declining stock of monetary gold. Recognizing this fact, President Charles de Gaulle seized the opportunity to attack American leadership by demanding gold. Gavin shows how U.S. policy makers in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations worried about a currency collapse and pressured Germany to offset the dollar costs of U.S. troops. Finally, Gavin offers a brief interpretation of events leading in 1971 to President Richard M. Nixon's decision to close the Treasury Department's gold window and float the dollar.	. . .

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