Book Review

Although both these volumes examine U.S.-Israel relations, the differences in subject matter and their opposite views concerning Israel's international conduct, the effect it has had on the alliance, and the support Israel continues to have from American Jews are noticeable. In The Uncertain Friendship, Herbert Druks has written an interpretive history of four presidents—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy—and their foreign policy toward Israel.

Ample scholarship already exists on this subject, and Druks breaks little new ground in source materials used. It is Druks's analysis of the diplomatic record that requires consideration and comment. What is notable in this volume is the prism through which the author sees the bilateral relationship. An underlying premise of Druks's account is that a close alliance with Israel, even with the consequent ramifications for American-Arab ties, is without question in the interest of the United States.	1
Although a case can be made that the United States and Israel share much in common, including the heritage of Western civilization and democratic principles, there is no consensus that what the United States and Israel share should in turn inevitably link them diplomatically. Druks's case would be stronger if he discussed the issue of U.S. foreign policy goals in the Middle East and then established his case as to why Israel should be embraced.	2
Proceeding chronologically from Roosevelt through Kennedy, Druks examines each president and assesses his administration in terms of the chief executive's identification with the goals of Zionism and Israel, his effectiveness in dealing with anti-Israel critics within the government, and his success in deepening a U.S.-Israel friendship and alliance. Only Kennedy wins Druks's praise. Roosevelt, whose "words were many and persuasive, but [whose] deeds were few and empty," is thoroughly excoriated. In union with the British, Roosevelt's policies "enabled the Germans and their European collaborators to slaughter six million Jewish men, women and children."	3
In 1948 Truman waited only ten minutes after the state of Israel was proclaimed before he made the United States the first nation to extend recognition to the new state. Yet Druks nonetheless concludes that the president followed a middle-of-the-road policy between the Arabs and Israel. For example, writes Druks, Truman always held back when it came to assisting Israel in obtaining the weapons it needed for its defense. This view of Truman is contrary to the praises he virtually always wins from Israelis and the staunchest supporters of close U.S.-Israel ties.	4
The section on Truman's recognition and the politics of 1948 raises the issue of what has been left out of Druks's analysis. There were strong voices in Truman's State and Defense departments against immediate recognition of the Jewish state. They based their arguments on geopolitical concerns related to the oil reserves in Arab nations, the proximity in the Middle East to the Soviet Union and the primacy of "containment" policy, and the need to sustain good relations with Arab nations. The contemporary arguments both for and against immediate recognition of Israel were reasonably made, and a fair treatment of the pros and cons of the issue should have preceded Druks's conclusions. Unfortunately, the case against immediate recognition is not given. The author dismisses the suggested strategy of not immediately recognizing Israel as simply an "appeasement of the Arabs."	. . .