Book Review

The debate over the lessons of the Vietnam War has gone on for so long that it is tempting to believe that there is nothing new to be said on the subject. By now, a quarter of a century after the fall of Saigon in late April 1975, the ideological positions have hardened between those who believe that the United States should never have intervened and those who argue that a potentially successful effort was sabotaged by a faulty strategy and the constant carping of the national media.	1
None of the three books under review here takes a position that will substantially change the nature of the debate, but they are all part of an important and useful process that will carry it beyond the stage of polemics into an era of painstaking historical analysis. As that takes place, one hopes that the simplistic assessments of the early postwar period will gradually be replaced by an understanding of the war as the deeply complex reality that it actually was.	2
It has long been a deeply held view in some quarters that United States intervention in Vietnam could have succeeded had the proper strategy been adopted from the outset. Seldom has this argument been put forward with greater persuasiveness than in Lewis Sorley's A Better War. A graduate of West Point with two decades of service in the United States Army, Sorley argues that America's failure in Vietnam can be traced partly to the inappropriate strategy adopted by Gen. William C. Westmoreland after his arrival as commander of United States troops there in 1964. By focusing on classical "search and destroy" offensives carried out by massive United States forces, Westmoreland neglected the pacification program and failed to recognize the crucial importance of training the South Vietnamese army eventually to take the lead in the war effort. The result was a rapid escalation of the war, heavy casualties on both sides, and a rising chorus of protest in the United States.	3
When Gen. Creighton Abrams succeeded Westmoreland in July 1968, he adopted a strategy more commensurate with the actual situation, engaging in modest "clear and hold" operations, building up the strength of local forces, and recognizing the importance of the pacification program. By now, however, Washington's policy had changed. At President Richard M. Nixon's order, United States combat troops were gradually being withdrawn while peace talks got under way in Paris. Although political and military conditions in South Vietnam improved during the early 1970s, public support for a continuation of the war had virtually evaporated in the United States, and the White House was interested solely in finding an honorable way to withdraw, an objective that was finally realized in the Paris agreement signed in January 1973. When Hanoi launched its final offensive in the South two years later, Saigon was unprepared to counter it effectively and rapidly collapsed.	4
Sorley makes a persuasive case that the Abrams strategy was more appropriate to the realities of the situation than was that of his predecessor, but his argument that Abrams might have succeeded had he been in charge at the outset ultimately does not convince. As he admits, ineffective leadership and a lack of self-confidence were at the root of Saigon's problem, and there is no convincing evidence that the Abrams approach would have adequately addressed it. He also underestimates the resourcefulness and dedication of America's adversary and the degree of support that the insurgents possessed in South Vietnam. At best, the United States might have been involved in an interminable pacification effort in South Vietnam while being faced with declining public support at home. It is not a promising recipe for success.	. . .