| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 112.3

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| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 112.3 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Comparative/World

Patrick O. Cohrs. The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pp. xiv, 693. $95.00.

Patrick O. Cohrs offers a major reinterpretation of post–World War I international history. Rejecting much of recent historiography, he seeks to demonstrate Anglo-American success in transforming European politics during the 1920s. In the aftermath of the Ruhr crisis of 1923, he argues, British and American policy makers compelled French and other European leaders to join in creating a new peace system that integrated Weimar Germany and thereby helped resolve the Franco-German and Polish-German questions. At the London and Locarno conferences of 1924 and 1925, which approved the Dawes plan for reparations and produced the Rhine security pact, they established a new European concert within a transatlantic framework. This Euro-Atlantic order or Pax Anglo-Americana, he contends, was the "'real' peace settlement" (pp. 154–184, 259–279) after World War I. Replacing the untenable Versailles Treaty of 1919, it united Britain's policy of appeasement in continental Europe with America's Progressive vision of an "open door" international economic order. Under Anglo-American hegemony, this "unfinished transatlantic peace order" (pp. 281–571) operated fairly well in the late 1920s, Cohrs argues. Its rules for peaceful change—or appeasement—could have preserved and enhanced European stability in the 1930s but the Great Depression destroyed this prospect. Adolf Hitler rejected both this Euro-Atlantic order and the earlier Versailles peace settlement.

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