| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 111.4

You have not been recognized as a subscriber to the AHR online. About 352 words from this article are provided below; about 830 words remain.

If you are a individual member of the American Historical Association, you may:: • login here if you have already registered for online access.; • Or if you're already logged in register your subscription.
• Set up your online account for the first time. AHA members can go to the AHA individual membership section to locate their member numbers.
If you are not a member of the American Historical Association, you can:: • Join the AHA and receive many member benefits including print and electronic issues of the American Historical Review.
• Purchase a research pass to gain two hour access to the entire History Cooperative web site. You will have full access to current issues of the American Historical Review (104.3-present). Note: the Research Pass does not provide access to JSTOR's holdings of the American Historical Review.
Instititutions can:: • Subscribe to this journal and receive print and electronic issues.
• Activate your existing subscription so that we recognize your IP number ranges.

| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 111.4 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Comparative/World

Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, editors. The Economics of World War I. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 345. $80.00.
Economics matter in waging war; the question is, how much? For Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison the answer is straightforward: "Ultimately, economics determined the outcome" of World War I (p. 5). One of the objectives of this collection of essays, a companion to Harrison's earlier volume, The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison (1988), is to convince the skeptical that this is in fact so. A second is to trace the legacy of the war, to demonstrate that its costs lasted decades after the guns had fallen silent. To make their case the editors have solicited contributions that cover the economic history of the major belligerents as well as two leading neutrals, the United States and Holland. The result is a welcome addition to the historical literature on the war.	1
The economic history of the war has been written, at least in the West, with a marked emphasis on the doings of Britain, Germany, France, and to a lesser degree, the United States. Other states appear fitfully, as part of a larger story, such as Russia, where the economic history of the war has been seen as preparatory to the Russian Revolution. Still others, notably the Ottoman Empire, are neglected entirely. Happily this volume goes some way to rectifying these oversights. Among the most interesting essays are those devoted to the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire. For many historians the contribution on the Ottoman Empire will break new ground, because so little exists in English on the economics of its war effort. Şevket Pamuk demonstrates that the "predominantly agrarian" (p. 113) structure of the Ottoman economy imposed shackles upon the state's ability to fight a large-scale modern war. Similarly, Max-Stephan Schulze on Austria-Hungary and Peter Gatrell on Russia show the strains that the war imposed upon these frail economies, although both challenge the assumption that prewar difficulties were insurmountable in waging modern war.	. . .

There are about 830 more words in this article. Please log in (or, if you are not yet an authorized user, please go to the User Setup page) to gain full access rights. Or if you're already logged in register your subscription.