| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 109.5

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| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 109.5 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Comparative/World

David C. Engerman. Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2003. Pp. vi, 399. $49.95.
This well-researched volume by David C. Engerman examines how American diplomats, scholars, and journalists between the late nineteenth century and the early 1950s viewed the economic development of Russia and the Soviet Union. It provides a wealth of information about these perceptions although their classification and interpretation invites questions. The major thrust of the argument is that these views were shaped by two conflicting schools of thought: particularism and universalism. The former emphasized the influence of the uniqueness of Russian national character, traditions, and history; the latter relied on more general sociological or social scientific concepts, including economic progress. With the rise of the Cold War, the second approach came to dominate. As it turns out, it is difficult to classify what the authors dealt with as belonging to one or the other of these schools.	1
While much can be said about the influence of particularism (most forcefully represented by George F. Kennan, much quoted here), the second, more recent approach is a good deal less clear cut and coherent, especially since it includes both critics of and sympathizers with the Soviet system. You could be a "universalist" who saw the Soviet Union as a highly repressive, totalitarian state, driven by its ambitious ideology (and pursuing—to make matters more confusing—traditional Russian geopolitical objectives), or a "universalist" who believed it was a modernizing society, converging with other developed, industrial societies and in the process becoming more open and pluralistic. It is particularly problematic to connect "the rising ideological fervor of the early 50s" (in the United States) with "the latest tools of social science" and suggest that the latter were supposed to help understand "the Soviet threat" of the period (p. 284). As a matter of fact, influential universalists like Talcott Parsons dismissed the importance of ideology, did not rely on the totalitarian model, and took an altogether benign view of the Soviet Union that was far from threatening: a modernizing society that was supposedly becoming more differentiated and pluralistic.	2
Engerman correctly points out that those beholden to the importance of Russian national character often excused or rationalized the huge human costs of rapid modernization with the help of a negative view of the Russian masses: "American observers found the sacrifices worthy because they considered the people unworthy. Common stereotypes of national character explained Russians' struggles and suffering ... To bring about important changes ... required significant force and loss of life—which peasants, fatalistic and inured to suffering were especially well-suited to endure" (p. 242). It is, however, far from certain—contrary to the author's firm belief—that these enthusiasts were well aware of the costs of the process. Some were (in an abstract fashion), many were not; very few, if any, knew the specifics. It is not easy to romanticize economic development when it rests on forced labor and is associated with famine, pervasive levels of intimidation, and the glorification of children who denounce politically incorrect parents to the authorities. Many of those who praised Soviet modernization were thoroughly uninformed of such matters.	3
Many American (and other Western) observers of Soviet industrialization took a favorable view of it, not because they overlooked the sufferings of the masses or because of their contempt for a backward society that was dragged into modernity but because they believed that rapid modernization was going to create an egalitarian and communitarian society maximizing opportunities for personal fulfillment and social justice. They expected that modernity would be attained without the problems characteristic of its capitalist version. Most observers who were aware of and bothered to justify the sufferings imposed by rapid economic modernization did so by the glorious goals pursued.	. . .

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