| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 108.5

You have not been recognized as a subscriber to the AHR online. About 155 words from this article are provided below; about 530 words remain.

If you are a individual member of the American Historical Association, you may:: • login here if you have already registered for online access.; • Or if you're already logged in register your subscription.
• Set up your online account for the first time. AHA members can go to the AHA individual membership section to locate their member numbers.
If you are not a member of the American Historical Association, you can:: • Join the AHA and receive many member benefits including print and electronic issues of the American Historical Review.
• Purchase a research pass to gain two hour access to the entire History Cooperative web site. You will have full access to current issues of the American Historical Review (104.3-present). Note: the Research Pass does not provide access to JSTOR's holdings of the American Historical Review.
Instititutions can:: • Subscribe to this journal and receive print and electronic issues.
• Activate your existing subscription so that we recognize your IP number ranges.

| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 108.5 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Comparative/World

Jennifer Siegel. Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia. London and New York: I. B. Tauris. 2002. Pp. xviii, 273. $39.50.

The study of Anglo-Russian relations before World War I has been an active one of late. In 1995 two monographs, John Albert White's Transition to Global Rivalry: Alliance Diplomacy and the Quadruple Entente, 1895–1907 and my own Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917, provided overlapping, if somewhat contradictory accounts of the relationship between London and St. Petersburg before 1914. Both books speak to the assertion, made by Keith Wilson, most particularly in The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904–1914 (1985), that prewar British policy was driven by a fear of Russia and that London went to war in 1914 in order to safeguard its empire against Russia, not to defend France against Russia.

. . .

There are about 530 more words in this article. Please log in (or, if you are not yet an authorized user, please go to the User Setup page) to gain full access rights. Or if you're already logged in register your subscription.