Book Review

Europe: Early Modern and Modern

This book examines the French response to the challenge presented by Nazi Germany from the rise of Adolf Hitler in 1933 to the outbreak of World War II in 1939. It focuses on the relationship between French intelligence on German intentions and capabilities and the development of French national policy. Generally speaking, two schools of thought about French strategy and diplomacy have emerged over the last two decades. The first views French policy through the optic of decadence and is consistent with the traditional Gaullist perception that, by 1939, the Third Republic was in an advanced stage of decline. Scholars such as Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Anthony Adamthwaite, and François Bédarida argue that France's political and military leaders surrendered to drift and indecision during the interwar period. An opposing school, represented by historians like Robert Young, Elisabeth du Réau, and Martin Alexander, rejects the notion of decadence and argues instead that France's leaders pursued foreign and defense policies that were quite reasonable and explicable given the enormous domestic political, social, and economic challenges they faced. Their failures in the realm of military security were not due to corruption or moral decay.

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The role of intelligence in the evolution of France's foreign and defense policies has not been integrated into this debate, and that is the gap that Peter Jackson seeks to fill. His largely successful effort brings him squarely into the camp of those scholars who reject the concept of decadence and moral fecklessness. Moreover, his thorough academic study of French intelligence during the 1930s will surely pave the way for broader chronological analyses such as those dealing with American, British, and Soviet intelligence that have appeared in the last fifteen years or so.

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