| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 107.4

You have not been recognized as a subscriber to the AHR online. About 219 words from this article are provided below; about 580 words remain.

If you are a individual member of the American Historical Association, you may:: • login here if you have already registered for online access.; • Or if you're already logged in register your subscription.
• Set up your online account for the first time. AHA members can go to the AHA individual membership section to locate their member numbers.
If you are not a member of the American Historical Association, you can:: • Join the AHA and receive many member benefits including print and electronic issues of the American Historical Review.
• Purchase a research pass to gain two hour access to the entire History Cooperative web site. You will have full access to current issues of the American Historical Review (104.3-present). Note: the Research Pass does not provide access to JSTOR's holdings of the American Historical Review.
Instititutions can:: • Subscribe to this journal and receive print and electronic issues.
• Activate your existing subscription so that we recognize your IP number ranges.

| Book Review | The American Historical Review, 107.4 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

Middle East and Northern Africa

Avi Shlaim. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. New York: W. W. Norton. 2000. Pp. xxv, 670. $32.50.

In this overview of Israel's relations with the Arabs, Avi Shlaim argues that Israeli leaders have been driven by a strategy, constructed by Zeev Jabotinsky (father of right-wing Zionism) in the 1920s, called the Iron Wall. Aimed at the creation of a secure state for the Jewish people in Palestine at a time when the vast majority of its inhabitants were Arabs, this strategy called for an alliance with a Western power and the buildup of military strength that would be used against the Arabs until they realized the futility of defeating Israel. Jabotinsky accepted the Palestinians as a people, and he anticipated negotiations with them, but only after the Arabs, who, he believed, understood only the language of force, had been decisively defeated. Superior military power, anchored in an alliance with a Western nation, would compel the Arabs to negotiate an end to the conflict. According to Shlaim, this is exactly what has occurred. Beginning in the 1970s, first the Egyptians and then the Palestinians and the Jordanians accepted Israel's military superiority and entered into negotiations from a position of weakness. Israel, Shlaim contends, is vindication of this strategy. . . .

There are about 580 more words in this article. Please log in (or, if you are not yet an authorized user, please go to the User Setup page) to gain full access rights. Or if you're already logged in register your subscription.