| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 91.2

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| Book Review | The Journal of American History, 91.2 | The History Cooperative

Book Review

The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862. Ed. by Gary W. Gallagher. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. xxii, 255 pp. $34.95, ISBN 0-8078-2786-X.)

This volume in the Military Campaigns of the Civil War series consists of eight essays examining both military and social aspects of the 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign. One of the best is by Gary W. Gallagher, who denies that Abraham Lincoln was frightened by Stonewall Jackson's movements; instead, "he kept his head and used Jackson's success in an attempt to coax [George B.] McClellan" into more aggressive action on the peninsula (p. xviii). If safety of Washington had been Lincoln's main concern, he would have ordered Irvin McDowell to the capital, instead of telling him to cooperate with Nathaniel Banks and John C. Frémont against Jackson. The effort failed, and Gallagher leaves unanswered the question whether Lincoln's attempt to cut off Jackson was feasible. William J. Miller faults Lincoln's planning; if Lincoln had been more timely, affairs on the peninsula would have gone better for the Union, and Robert E. Lee might not have been able to attack McClellan. Miller asks whether, if the Union generals were bumblers, Jackson can rightly be credited with the great skill attributed to him. Miller justifies Jackson's reputation by exploring Union failures caused by divided command and unclear orders.

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